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Abstract: 
This paper operates at the interface of the literature on the impact of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) on host countries, and the literature on the determinants of institutional quality. We 
argue that FDI contributes to economic development by improving institutional quality in the 
host country and we attempt to test this proposition using a large panel data set of 70 
developing countries during the period 1981 and 2005, and we show that FDI inflows have a 
positive and highly significant impact on property rights. The result appears to be very robust 
and is and not affected by model specification, different control variables, or a particular 
estimation technique. As far as we are aware this is the first paper to empirically test the FDI 
– property rights linkage.  
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1. Introduction 
The impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host countries is a well researched topic and 
the bulk of the literature focuses on the impact of FDI on economic growth. However, with 
the rapid growth of FDI inflows during the 1990’s and the growing competition among 
countries to attract FDI flows, researchers have recently shown a resurgence of interest in 
studying new aspects of the impact of FDI flows on host countries. Most of the work in this 
area argues that the increase of FDI inflows in the 1990’s and the competition among 
governments to attract FDI have led to “bidding wars” in which governments were forced to 
adopt policies with a negative impact on host countries’ economies such as a reduction in tax 
rates, deterioration in standards of the environment, and workers’ rights (see, for example, 
Oman, 2000). Some of these negative aspects, known as the “race to the bottom” effects, are 
supported by empirical evidence. For example, Garretsen and Peeters (2007) find that FDI 
inflows lead to lower corporate tax rates. However, foreign investors do not only search for 
lower tax rates, they also demand better institutional quality, and governments competing to 
attract FDI may be induced to supply them with an efficient institutional framework. FDI 
may therefore contribute to economic development through improving institutional quality in 
the host country. This aspect of FDI effects has to our knowledge not been studied 
previously.  
 
Institutional quality has been identified as one of the most important, if not the most 
important, determinant of economic growth. Hall and Jones (1999) find that differences in 
income growth are largely explained by differences in institutional quality. Knack and Keefer 
(1995) identify property rights as crucial for growth and investment. While there is 
considerable consensus that institutions matter for growth, how efficient institutions come 
about and what explains differences in institutional quality between and within countries still 
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remains an open question. The empirical evidence on the determinants of property rights 
links institutions to cultural, historical, and geographic factors (see, for example, Levine 
(2005)). If property rights are mainly determined by factors like culture or geography, then 
what explains changes in institutions over time and if property rights are only determined by 
unchangeable factors like history and geography, then there is not much prospect for 
developing countries to achieve high quality institutions. There is a clear need to link 
institutions to changeable, if not controllable, variables. Such evidence would provide a basis 
for institutional reform that enables developing countries to build high quality institutions.  
 
The hypothesis that this study introduces and empirically investigates is whether FDI inflows 
have a positive impact on property rights in the host country. Testing this hypothesis has, we 
believe, both academic and practical significance. First, it explores a new dimension on the 
impact of FDI inflows on the host country, which may advance our understanding of the 
contribution of FDI inflows to economic growth in the host country. Second, it provides a 
new argument and empirical verification on explaining differences in property rights, one of 
the most important aspects of institutional quality.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section two briefly discusses the theory of 
property rights determinants with more emphasis on the empirical literature. Section three 
introduces arguments of linking property rights to FDI inflows. The empirical results are 
presented in section four; and section five concludes. 
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2. Determinants of the institutional quality 
According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), theories that explain 
determinants of institutional quality, and in particular property rights protection and contract 
enforcement can be grouped into three broad categories: economic, political and  cultural. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) and Levine (2005) add the endowments view. 
While economic theory stresses the role of social efficiency when creating institutions, 
political theory focuses on the redistributional aspects. Cultural theory emphasizes the role of 
social beliefs and endowment theory points to the role of geographical factors, such as the 
availability of natural resources or climate, in shaping institutions1. 
 
Economic theory, represented by Demsetz (1967) and North (1981), argues that institutions 
are created when it is efficient to do so. To repeat the example provided by La Porta et al. 
(1999), private property rights are created when land becomes scares, and when their benefits 
exceeds the cost of their enforcement. As institutions are generally considered efficient, 
economic theory sees poor property rights as a reflection of insufficient resources and high 
costs, rather than of bad institutions. Within this view, economic development creates a 
demand for good institutions, and governments will oblige, if benefits exceed enforcement 
costs. 
 
Political theory, represented by Marx 1872, North 1990 and Olson 1993, states that 
institutions are designed by the elite to retain existing power structures and history provides 
many examples that demonstrate that institutions are shaped by the ability of powerful groups 
to extract rents, rather than social efficiency considerations: Russian czars, Ottoman sultans 
                                                 
1 This section is a summary of the discussions in La Porta et al. (1999) and Beck et al. (2003). 
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and Tokugawa shoguns all created institutions that increased their absolute authority and 
control, resulting in a poor definition and enforcement of property rights (see La Porta et al. 
(1999) and references therein). According to this view, political divergence in society (social, 
ethnic, class or other) has a negative impact on government performance and property rights. 
The other prediction of this theory is based upon the historic circumstances within which 
common and civil laws have been developed. Common Law was developed, in part, as a tool 
to limit the authority of the crown and to protect property rights, while civil law was 
developed to restrain the authority of sovereigns over their subjects. Thus political theory 
argues that civil law, compared with common law, has a negative impact on property rights.  
 
Cultural theory, represented by Weber (1958), Banfield (1958), Putham (1993) and Landes 
(1998), states that institutions are a reflection of the beliefs in a society. In some societies, 
intolerance and distrust run so high that governments cannot function effectively which 
produces poor institutional quality and insufficient property rights protection (La Porta et al. 
(1999)). Landes (1998) argues that Catholicism and Islam are hostile to institutional 
development. The reason for this, according to Landes (1998) and Putnam (1993), is that 
these two religions tend to foster “vertical bonds of authority”, which limits the security of 
property rights and private contracting (Levine, 2005).  
 
The endowment theory, represented by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Acemoglu et al. 
(2001), states that today’s institutions are affected by factor endowments and initial 
conditions at the time of colonisation. Two versions of the endowment theory exist: 
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) emphasizes that natural resource endowments, related to 
mining and crops, often gave rise to highly unequal societies, where the ruling elite prevented 
the development of egalitarian institutions and favoured institutions that fostered their 
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hegemony (Levine, 2005).  Acemoglu et al. (2001) establish a link between settler strategies 
of European colonialists and institutional quality in developing countries today. They argue 
that in areas where disease produces high mortality rates, Europeans did not settle, but set up 
‘extractive’ colonies (e.g. Congo). The institutions of these ‘extractive colonies’ favoured the 
elite and facilitated the extraction of wealth; only in ‘settler colonies’ where Europeans 
colonialists settled, did they create institutions that supported property rights (e.g. Australia) .   
 
3. Foreign direct investment and property rights 
There is growing evidence that greater integration into the global economy has an impact on 
institutional quality. For example, Bonaglia et al. (2001) provides robust empirical support 
that higher import openness lowers corruption. Li and Reuveny (2003) establish that trade 
openness and portfolio investment have a negative impact on democracy, while FDI has a 
positive one. Larrain and Tavares (2004) show evidence that FDI is a robust predictor of 
corruption and that larger FDI inflows reduce the level of corruption in the host country.  El-
Marhubi (2004) finds that trade openness has a positive impact on governance indictors and 
concludes that openness may encourage governments to adopt better governance to reap the 
full benefits of integration into the world economy. Mosley and Uno (2007) find FDI to be 
positively and significantly correlated with labour rights, while trade openness impacts on 
them negatively.    
 
This section develops arguments that facilitate a better understanding of the possible impact 
of FDI on property rights. In our view, FDI affects both the demand and the supply of 
property rights, and through this, FDI leads to better institutional quality. The demand for 
property rights arises because property rights allow individuals and firms to capture potential 
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rents and benefits; governments, on the other hand, may be induced to supply property rights 
when it is advantageous to do so.  
 
 
 
 3.1. Demand side
 
Foreign direct investors may create an effective demand for better institutional quality in the 
host country. This may be the case for two reasons: first, there is growing evidence that 
foreign investors consider institutional quality, especially property rights, as an important 
factor for their business success2.  Second, there is evidence that multinational corporations 
tend to manipulate their business environment in order to maximize profits and to achieve 
business goals. For example, Poynter (1985) finds that some multinational corporations 
attempt to change government policy by entering domestic political processes. Moreover, 
according to Navaretti and Venables (2006), foreign investors at times rely on domestic 
interest groups with a vested interest to pressurize government to change the FDI incentive 
scheme in their favour. Libman (2006) provides evidence showing that multinational 
corporations have played an important role in shaping the course of reform and institutional 
change in some transitional countries. Given the above points, it seems plausible that foreign 
investors with a lasting commitment to the host country have an incentive to lobby for 
institutional change when faced with a poor property rights and business climate. FDI inflows 
should therefore create a higher demand for better institutional quality and property rights. 
 
                                                 
2 See Ali, Fiess and MacDonald (2008) for more details. 
7 
 
 3.2. Supply side
 
Why would governments respond to the demand of foreign investors? North (1981) assumes 
that the government acts like a discriminating monopolist, offering property rights protection 
to different groups of constituents in return for tax revenues. Using this model, one may 
argue that governments might find it advantageous to provide foreign investors with property 
rights and to ensure contract enforcement so that they can enjoy the benefits of FDI inflows 
which ultimately strengthen the government positions. While this might explain why 
governments protect property rights and enforce contracts, it does not explain why 
governments would commit to this role if they find it in their advantage to renege their 
commitments. For example, policy makers may try to alter property rights for their own 
benefits after the investments took place (North and Weingast 1989). 
 
Two factors may prevent governments from reneging on their commitments, or at least 
making it costly for them to do so. The first factor is reputation. The fact that foreign 
investors can reallocate their investments to another country makes government value the 
long run effects resulting from reneging on their commitment. Thus, building a good 
reputation can induce governments to honour their today so as to retain the opportunity to 
attract FDI inflows in the future. The other factor is related to devising more complex 
institutional arrangements to limit a ruler’s incentives to renege. Bullow and Rogoff (1989) 
show that reputation alone may not be enough to prevent reneging in developing countries 
and that more complex institutional arrangement are necessary to police reneging (North and 
Weingast 1989). In the context of FDI inflows to developing countries, Buthe and Milner 
(2005) stress that governments try to assure foreign investors about their commitments by 
binding themselves by various kinds of agreements and treaties, such as bilateral investment 
treaties, preferential trade agreements, and multilateral agreements. These international 
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commitments, although not determining government behaviour, are more credible than 
domestic commitments, because reneging on these commitments is more costly.     
 
The above arguments can be supported by the fact that many countries, in an attempt to 
attract FDI inflows, have since the beginning of the 1980s introduced several changes in their 
regulatory frameworks. The aim of these changes was to create stronger incentives for 
foreign investors. According to UNCTAD (2002), in 2001 alone, 71 countries have 
introduced 208 changes to their FDI laws and 194 of these changes created a more favourable 
climate in an effort to attract more FDI. Furthermore, many countries have tried to increase 
their commitment on proving a better regulatory framework for FDI by entering into bilateral 
investment treaties. The number of these treaties has increased rapidly over recent decades 
(UNCTAD, 2002). It seems plausible to view these changes to domestic regulations and 
investment treaties at least in part as host governments’ responding to foreign investors’ 
demand for a better investment climate, including better institutions.    
 
In sum, we expect that in a search for higher profits foreign investors will demand more 
secure property rights; host governments, aware of the potential benefits of FDI for growth 
and development, will respond. In an attempt to retain established FDI and attract new FDI, 
governments will further try to signal a high level of commitment by binding themselves 
through various international treaties. It seems therefore entirely plausible to expect that FDI 
inflows have a positive impact on institutional quality and in particular on the protection of 
property rights.         
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4. Empirical results 
The previous sections laid out a hypothesis about the impact of FDI inflows on property 
rights. We now attempt to empirically verify this hypothesis. To ensure comparability of our 
analysis with existing work on the determinants of institutional quality, we first replicate the 
cross-sectional analysis of La Porta et al. (1999), Beck et al. (2003) and Levine (2005). We 
then expand on their work in several directions, which significantly adds to the literature on 
determinants of institutional quality and property rights. In particular, we extend the cross-
sectional analysis in La Porta et al. (1999), Beck et al. (2003) and Levine (2005) to a dynamic 
panel setting which allows us to study variations over time. We further control for the 
possibility, that some of the regressors, in particular FDI could be endogenous. Moreover, 
North (1990) argues that previous levels of institutional quality determine current levels (see 
below). The use of a dynamic panel framework also enables us to test this hypothesis.  
Finally, to gain robustness, we present results from different estimation techniques. In 
general, we will estimate this model: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Proty B B polit B Econ B FDI B Cultr B Endo B V ε= + + + + + + +  
Where: Proty is the property rights index. Polit is a vector of variables representing the 
political theory. Econ is a vector of variables capturing the impact of economic development. 
FDI is the ratio of foreign direct investment inflows to gross domestic product. Cultr is a 
vector of variables capturing the impact of culture. Endo is a vector of variables representing 
the endowment theory. V is a vector of controlling variables and ε  is the disturbance term.  
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 4.1. Results from cross-sectional estimations
 
To investigate the impact of FDI inflows on property rights, we start by using the same data 
set as La Porta et al. (1999). To measure property rights protection, La Porta et al. (1999) use 
the Property Rights index in the year 1997. This index is based, broadly, on the degree of 
legal protection of private property; the extent to which the government protects and enforce 
laws that protect private property; the probability that the government will expropriate private 
property; and a country’s legal protection of private property. This index takes values 
between 1 and 5 and higher values indicate greater protection of private property. 
 
As already mentioned above, La Porta et al. (1999) empirically evaluate the contribution of 
political, cultural and economic theories in explaining institutional quality, they also control 
for geography.   Political theory is tested by the degree of ethno-linguistic fractionalization as 
well as the origin of commercial law. The Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index is an 
average of several measures of ethnic diversity. The index ranges from 0 to 1 and is expected 
to have a negative impact on property rights. The higher ethnic and linguistic division, the 
poorer are property rights.  A country’s Company Law or Commercial Code can stem from 
five different origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) German 
Commercial Code; (4) Scandinavian Commercial Code; (5) Socialist/Communist laws. Given 
the historical context within which these Laws have been developed, as already explained 
earlier, it is expected that, respective to English Common Law, French, German, 
Scandinavian, socialist laws have a negative impacts on property rights index.  
 
The relative share of Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims in a country (religious 
composition of population) proxy cultural determinants of institutional quality (La Porta et 
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al., 1999). It is expected that relative to Protestantism, Catholicism and Islam have a negative 
impact on property rights. 
 
La Porta et al. (1999) use the logarithm of the average of GNP per capita in current US 
dollars during 1970-1995 as a proxy for economic determinants of institutional quality. Per 
capita income is expected to have a positive impact on the property rights index. La Porta et 
al. (1999) further use latitude, scaled to take values between 0 and 1, to control for 
geography. They argue that latitude impacts institutional quality as more temperate regions 
have more productive agriculture and healthier climates, which allowed them to develop 
better economically and possibly also institutionally.  
 
The results are summarized in Table 1. Model 1 replicates model 3 in Table 4 in La Porta et 
al. (1999). It serves as our benchmark to which we add the other variables discussed above 
and in which we explicitly test the impact of FDI on property rights. Model 1 replicates La 
Porta et al. (1999)’s finding that political variables, represented by ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and French legal origin, have the expected negative impact on property 
rights.  In Model 2, we control for the impact of economic and geographic factors by 
including log of GNP per capita and latitude. The results show that both of them have the 
expected positive impact on property rights, however, ethno-linguistic fractionalization losses 
its significance. In Model 3, we add the average of FDI-GDP ratio during 1970-1995 to test 
the impact of FDI on property rights index. Model 3 shows that FDI has a positive and 
significant impact on property rights. The fact FDI maintains its significance after controlling 
for the income level means that FDI affects property rights beyond its impact on economic 
development and income level. We retain FDI as a regressor in all further model 
specifications. In Model 4, we control for the impact cultural factors on property rights by 
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including the percentage of the population which belongs to Catholic, Muslim or other non-
protestant faith. The results show that FDI does not lose significance once we control for the 
cultural determinants of property rights, however, the results show that culture factors do not 
have significant impact on property rights once we control for other factors.  
Table 1- Property Rights and FDI: Cross-sectional regressions. 
(Dependent variable: Porperty rights index 1997)(1) 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6  (2) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.826*** 0.332 0.387 0.474 -0.103 -0.257 
 (-2.76) (1.26) (1.39) (1.64) (-0.24) (-0.34) 
French Legal Origin -0.704*** -0.559*** -0.483*** -0.560*** -0.728** -0.604 
 (-3.51) (-3.84) (-3.14) (-2.99) (-2.37) (-1.15) 
Socialist Legal Origin -1.386*** -1.114*** -1.133*** -1.273*** - - 
 (-3.65) (-4.26) (-4.47) (-4.30)                  
German Legal Origin 1.084*** 0.068 0.285 0.270 - - 
 (4.91) (0.28) (1.07) (1.08)                  
Scandinavian Legal Origin 0.879*** -0.531** -0.394 -0.030 - - 
 (3.08) (-2.03) (-1.42) (-0.06)                  
Latitude  1.638*** 1.964*** 2.178*** - - 
  (3.30) (3.83) (3.67)                  
Log GNP per capita  0.417*** 0.365*** 0.342*** - - 
  (5.79) (5.09) (3.82)                  
FDI-GDP Ratio   0.110** 0.113*** 0.182*** 0.468** 
   (2.57) (2.71) (2.74) (2.16) 
Catholic    0.007 -0.011 -0.031 
    (1.27) (-1.22) (-1.59) 
Muslim    0.003 -0.007 -0.018 
    (0.56) (-0.85) (-1.39) 
Other Religion    0.006 -0.012 -0.033 
    (1.06) (-1.40) (-1.40) 
Independence     0.502 1.379 
     (0.91) (1.67) 
Settler Mortality     -0.191** 0.023 
     (-2.07) (0.19) 
Intercept 3.981*** 0.191 0.262 -0.091 5.039*** 4.988*** 
 (16.97) (0.38) (0.51) (-0.12) (6.65) (4.59) 
No. of obs. 124 124 121 121 69 36    
F 91 48 39 31 7 6               
Note: (1) Values in parentheses are White heteroskedastic adjusted t-values. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. F is F-statistics. (2) FDI is instrumented by the by real exchange rate, infrastructure, and continental dummies for Africa and 
Latin America. The validity of these instruments is supported by Sargan Test 
2χ (3) = 5.36 (Prob> 2χ = ( 0.147)). 
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Model 5 shows the results based on data from Beck et al. (2003) and Levine (2005). Beck et 
al. (2003) and Levine (2005) basically use the same data set as in La Porta et al. (1999) but 
they only include countries of either British or French legal origin, as most countries are 
based on these legal tradition, which are also the most distinct.  
 
The other difference between La Porta et al. (1999) and Beck et al. (2003) and Levine (2005) 
is that the latter two studies introduce the endowment factor as an additional determinant of 
institutional quality. Beck et al. (2003) and Levine (2005) follow Acemoglu et al. (2001) and 
use the settler mortality rate, the log of the annualized deaths per thousand European soldiers 
in European colonies in the early 19th century, to test endowment theory. The model shows 
that French legal origin has the expected negative impact on property rights, while Ethnic 
Fractionalization has the expected negative sign but is insignificant. The results also show 
that FDI maintains a significant and positive impact on property rights. Model 5 shows that 
non-Protestant religions have negative but insignificant impact on property rights index. 
Settler Mortality has a negative and statistically significant correlation with Property Rights, 
which confirms the endowment theory expectations.  
 
Beck et al. (2003) and Levine (2005) argue that the longer a country has spent in 
independence, the more time it has had to develop sound institutions and hence the better its 
property rights might have become. They therefore use the percentage of years since 1776 
that a country has been independent to control for the impact of independence on property 
rights. The results show the independence does not have significant impact on property 
rights, though it has the expected sign.  
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So far there has been no consideration of the endogeneity problem. It should be noticed that 
the above results may be subject to endogeneity bias. In fact, there is a large body of 
literature showing that FDI is determined by institutional quality and property rights. Thus, in 
Model 6, we have tried to control for endogeneity problem by using instrumental variable 
approach (IV). The choice of appropriate instruments should be driven by the literature of 
FDI determinants. A good instrument should be highly correlated with FDI but not with the 
disturbance term of property rights regression. Several empirical studies show that real 
exchange rates and infrastructure quality are among the significant determents of FDI inflows 
(Froot and Stein 1991), (Blonigen, 1997), and (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Therefore, we 
instrumented FDI by real exchange rates and infrastructure measured by number of landline 
per thousand of people, in addition to, continental dummies for Africa and Latin America. 
The result of IV regression, reported in Table 1 Model 6, shows that the estimated coefficient 
on FDI are still significantly positive, which can be interpreted as  impact of FDI on Property 
rights is robust to endogeneity problem.  
 
The above results make it very clear that, compared to other determinants; the correlation 
between FDI and property rights is highly significant in a cross-sectional setting. These 
results can be interpreted as offering base-line support to our hypothesis that FDI has a 
positive impact on institutional quality, and that countries that attracted more FDI enjoy 
greater protection of property rights. However, these results are not without limitations, as 
they do not consider changes in property rights over time. This issue is taken up in more 
detail below.  
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 4.2. Results from panel data estimations
 
The cross-sectional approach helps us to explain the differences in property rights across 
countries, i.e. identifying which characteristics explain why one country has a higher degree 
of property rights protection than another. A panel framework is however needed to assess 
how institutions are affected by FDI over time, and how different determinants interact 
dynamically. To investigate the time dimension of variations in property rights, we use a 
sample of 70 developing countries over the period 1981-2005.  Data availability restricts the 
sample size and the time period covered. The Appendix describes the sample and data 
sources used in the subsequent analysis. Property rights index is constructed by combining 
two indexes: Law and Order and Investment Profile, both of which published by Political 
Risk Services Group. The index is scaled to take values between 0 and 12, with higher values 
mean better protection of property rights. Law and Order index assesses the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system, popular observance of the law, and the effectiveness of 
sanctions. Investment Profile index assesses contract viability, expropriation risk, and profits 
repatriation. 
 
 We construct a panel dataset with data averaged over each of the 5-year periods between 
1981 and 2005. Within our sample, some countries have made remarkable improvements in 
their property rights indexes, while others experienced deterioration (see Table 3 and Figure 1 
in the Appendix). Morocco’s property rights index, for example, increased from 4.5 in the 
period 1981-85 to 9.94 in the period 2000-05. Bolivia, which started from a very low score, 
2.12, in the 1980’s, reached a high score of 7.4 in 2000-05. The same applies to Chile and 
Tunisia.  Zimbabwe, on the other hand, showed a decline in its score from 4.25 in 1984-85 to 
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2.47 in 2000-05. Cote d'Ivoire and Venezuela also experienced a fall in the property rights 
index.  
 
Table 2: Changes in averages of property Rights Index 
 
country 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 
Morocco 4.542 4.542 7.567 9.875 9.938 
Bolivia 2.125 3.092 5.150 7.533 7.400 
Chile 5.417 7.000 8.108 9.475 10.483 
Tunisia 4.500 4.500 7.025 9.367 9.225 
Venezuela, RB 6.104 6.892 6.883 6.300 4.925 
Cote d'Ivoire 7.167 6.775 5.908 6.208 5.517 
Zimbabwe 4.250 4.708 5.750 6.050 2.475 
  
 
 
We start our panel analysis with a Random Effects model. This model specification allows us 
to capture the impact of the time-invariant variables that represent culture, political, and 
endowment theories. One problem with this technique is that it does not allow for the 
endogeneity of some of regressors, particularly FDI. To reduce the problem of endogeneity, 
we have lagged all endogenous variables for one period, that is, five years. We also use 
system GMM where lagged differences and levels of the endogenous variables are used as 
instruments. 
 
    The results are reported in Table 3. Model 1 includes political variables, Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization index and French legal origin, in addition to lagged FDI inflows. Both of the 
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political variables have the expect sign, although not statistically significant. FDI has the 
expected positive sign and is highly significant. In Model 2, we add variables representing 
cultural theory; the results show that Catholicism has a negative and significant correlation 
with the property rights index, while Islam has no significant correlation with property rights. 
The FDI term is still significant and positive and Ethno-linguistic fractionalization index 
becomes significantly related to property rights, while French legal origin dummy becomes 
positively but insignificantly correlated with property rights.  
 
Model 3 controls for endowment and economic effects, by including settler mortality and 
GDP per capita growth3. The results show that while settler mortality has a negative but 
insignificant impact, lagged economic growth has a positive and significant impact on 
property rights, which confirms economic theory. FDI remains significant even after 
controlling for the impact of economic growth, which supports the claim that FDI influences 
property rights beyond its contribution to economic growth and development.  
 
Using settler mortality reduces the sample size from 70 to 57 countries as we have only 
limited country coverage for settler mortality. To deal with this problem, we replace settler 
mortality rate with the ratio of primary exports to GDP. This variable is widely used in the 
literature to represent natural resources abundance (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995). Using the 
primary export ratio further accords with the view of Engerman and Sokoloff about 
endowments. Model 4 shows the results; the coefficient on primary export ratio suggests that 
natural resource endowments have a negative correlation with property rights, which give some 
support Engerman and Sokoloff’s view, however it is not significant. Controlling for natural 
                                                 
3 We also used GDP per capita to control for economic effect but it provided poor results.  
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resources endowment does not affect the significance of FDI; interestingly Catholic dummy 
becomes statistically significant.   
 
Table 3-Property Rights and FDI: Panel Data Regressions 
(Dependent variable: Porperty rights index(1981-2005)  5-year intervals)  
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8 
 RE(1) RE(1) RE(1) RE(1) RE(1) FE(2) Sys GMM(3) Sys GMM(4) 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization -0.671 -0.947** -0.327 -0.246 -0.074 - 0.019 - 
 (-1.50) (-2.07) (-0.59) (-0.47) (-0.14)  (0.07)  
French Legal Origin -0.352 0.232 0.490 0.373 0.415 - 0.648** 0.688*** 
 (-1.23) (0.63) (1.15) (0.91) (1.02)  (2.47) (3.05) 
Economic Growth - - 0.163*** 0.133*** 0.129*** 0.119*** 0.209*** 0.236*** 
   (4.65) (3.87) (3.71) (3.27) (2.71) (3.38) 
FDI-GDP Ratio 0.237*** 0.241*** 0.172*** 0.200*** 0.173*** 0.162*** 0.116** 0.124*** 
 (6.50) (6.59) (4.93) (5.00) (4.59) (3.13) (2.24) (2.71) 
Catholic - -0.016** -0.011 -0.014** -0.011 - -0.004 -0.008** 
  (-2.47) (-1.57) (-2.20) (-1.63)  (-1.08) (-2.12) 
Muslim - -0.007 -0.005 -0.010 -0.008 - -0.004 -0.006* 
  (-1.25) (-0.76) (-1.58) (-1.19)  (-1.06) (-1.88) 
Settler Mortality - - -0.174 - - - - - 
   (-1.31)      
Resource Endowments - - - -0.019 -0.025** -0.009 -0.010 -0.005 
    (-1.62) (-2.13) (-0.28) (-1.38) (-0.76) 
Trade - - - - 0.007** 0.014** 0.004 0.004* 
     (2.49) (1.98) (1.49) (1.87) 
Lagged property right - - - - - - 0.619*** 0.492*** 
       (5.90) (4.83) 
Ethnic Tensions - - - - - - - 0.231*** 
        (4.67) 
Intercept 6.342*** 6.860*** 6.596*** 6.432*** 5.877*** 4.991*** 1.081 1.211* 
 (18.59) (16.97) (9.50) (14.42) (11.33) (10.60) (1.3) (1.73) 
No. of groups 70 70 57 68 68 68 68 68 
No. of obs. 278 278 224 240 240 240 240 240 
Wald χ2 51.44(3) 58.62(5) 86.72(7) 69.37(7) 77.67(8) - 644.64(12) 902.91(12) 
Note: (1) Random effects model, z-values reported in parentheses. (2) Fixed effects model, t-values reported in parentheses. (3) System GMM. Arellano-Bond 
test for AR (2) in first differences: z = -1.01, Pr > z = 0.312, Hansen test of over identification restrictions: 2χ  (32)   = 34.29, Prob > 2χ  = 0.359.    
(4) System GMM.  Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) in first differences: z = -1.24, Pr > z = 0.215. Hansen test of over identification restrictions: 2χ  (32)   = 33.67 
, Prob > 2χ =  0.386.  Model 7 & 8 include time dummies.   *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Rodrik (2000) argues that openness to trade could help developing countries to build sound 
institutions. A growing number of imperial evidence shows that trade has a positive impact 
on some aspects on institutions such as corruption (see for example Bonaglia et al. (2001) and 
El-Marhubi (2004)). Thus, in Model 5, we control for openness by including lagged trade-
GDP ratio. The result shows that trade ratio has a positive and significant impact on property 
rights; the negative impact of natural resource abundance becomes significant, while Catholic 
dummy loses its significance. Interestingly, FDI maintains its positive and significant 
correlation with property rights, while political and cultural variables lose their significance.  
 
In Model 6, we use fixed effects technique to investigate the role played by FDI in 
determining property rights. This technique concentrates on variations within countries which 
gives insights in how variations in FDI contribute to explaining the variations of property 
rights index in each country around its own mean. In other words, Fixed Effects technique 
allows us to investigate what causes property rights to change over time within each country.  
However, this advantage comes at the cost of dropping time invariant variables. Model 6 
shows that FDI remains significant and so does GDP growth term. Trade ratio also enters 
positively and significantly. This result suggest that these three variables played positive role 
in determining changes in property rights index during the period of the analysis4. The 
endowment variable, on the other hand, loses significance, although it maintains a negative 
sign. This may be due to the fact that the primary exports to GDP ratio varies little over time, 
which implies that the endowments view can explains differences in property rights across 
countries, but not over time.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Note that, as in the previous models, we lagged all of these variables one period, i.e. five years, in order to 
mitigate the problem of the endogeneity. 
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So far, we have dealt with the endogeneity of FDI by using the lagged value of FDI inflows. 
A more appropriate way to address endogeneity is to use the instrumental variable approach. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) show that in a dynamic panel setting lagged differences of 
endogenous variables can be used as effective instruments. Including the lagged value of the 
property rights index further allows us to study to what extent past institutional quality 
determines present institutional quality. North 1990 argues that history matters for 
institutional change, in a sense that institutional quality in the past has an impact in the 
current institutional quality. North states that the institutional framework provides society 
with opportunities (both politically and economically) and agents try to benefit from these 
opportunities within the existing institutional framework; they however also try to maximise 
profits by altering the existent institutional framework. North (1990) argues that the nature of 
the existing institutional quality may provide incentives for agents to alter it. To illustrate, in 
an inefficient institutional framework, organizations will form with the specific purpose to 
benefit from the opportunities offered by this inefficient framework, and these organizations 
will devote resources to maintain these inefficiencies. North (1990) states that this 
mechanism explains the persistent of the inefficient institutions in developing countries. On 
the other hand, organizations embedded in an efficient institutional framework will devote 
resources to maintain efficiency, as this serves their interests. North (1990) states that this 
mechanism explains the development of the American economy in the nineteenth century. 
Based on this argument, one would expect that lagged property rights have a positive impact 
on the current institutional quality, as efficient institutions provide agents with incentives to 
further increase the level of efficiency, promoting even more efficient institutions in the 
future.   
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Model 7 shows the results from system GMM estimation. In this model, we include the 
lagged dependent variable, the property rights index, as an additional explanatory variable. In 
this specification, the lagged dependent variables and the time-invariant country-specific 
error terms are correlated, and both random and fixed effects models produce inconsistent 
estimations. Arellano and Bond (1990) solve this problem by using generalized method of 
moment (GMM). They eliminate the country-specific error term by taking the first difference 
of the model and then use the lagged levels of the dependent variable as instruments for the 
first differences of the dependent variable. The same procedure can be applied to any 
endogenous variable within the set of explanatory variables. This technique is often called 
difference-GMM (Baum, 2005). Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
acknowledge a potential weakness in difference-GMM, since the lagged levels are often poor 
instruments for first-differenced variables (Baum, 2005). They propose, therefore, to use 
lagged levels as well as lagged differences as instruments. This technique is generally 
referred to as system GMM. Both difference and system GMM require an absence of second-
order serial correlation in the residuals of the differenced model. As standard errors of the 
difference and system GMM estimators are shown to have a severe downward bias (Baum, 
2005), the Windmeijer (2005)’s finite-sample correction is applied to correct this bias. A 
Hansen test of the over-identifying restrictions is used to test overall appropriateness of 
instruments. 
 
In Model 7, we treated FDI inflows, economic growth, and trade ratio as endogenous 
variables. We find that the basic assumption of no second-order serial correlation is satisfied. 
The Hansen test approves the validity of the instruments for Model 7. The results show that 
the lagged value of property rights has a positive and significant impact on the current level 
of property rights index, which supports North’s hypothesis. More importantly, FDI still has a 
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positive and significant impact on institutional quality index. Economic growth maintains its 
significance, while trade ratio loses its. Interestingly, all culture and political variables lose 
their significance apart from French legal origin which becomes significant but with the 
wrong sign. This can be interpreted as the evidence on political and culture theory is sensitive 
to model specifications or sample changes. This may call for other proxies for the political 
factors.  One attempt could be by replacing the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index, which 
primarily measures ethnic division, with an index that captures the degree of tension resulting 
from racial, ethnic, or language divisions5. It seems reasonable to assume that the degree of 
social tension that results from ethnic and religious division is more important for 
institutional quality than ethnic division per se. One can cite many cases in developed 
countries where ethnic linguistic groups live in relative harmony without negative 
implications on institutional quality. For example, Canada and Belgium have Ethno-linguistic 
indices of 0.376 and 0.364, which are above the sample average, but have ones of the highest 
score of property rights index, 10.73 and 11.95 respectively. An additional advantage of 
using ethnic tension index rather than ethnic division is the former is time-variant and hence 
allows us to study the impact of political variables on institutional quality over time. 
The results are shown in Model 8. As can be seen from Model 8, this change has led to 
substantial improvements in our results. Political factors, represented by ethnic tension index, 
now have the expected sign: improvements in the ethnic tension index have a positive and 
significant impact on property rights6. However, French legal origin is still significant but 
with the wrong sing. More interestingly, culture factors become significant with the rights 
sing. More related to our paper object, FDI maintains its significance which can be viewed as 
additional support for our main hypothesis.  
 
                                                 
5 The Ethnic Tension index is published by PRS Group. See Appendix A for  details about this index.     
6 Note that the index is scaled to take values between 0 and 12, with higher values mean less tension. 
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To summarize our results, FDI appears to be a robust predictor of property rights. The impact 
of FDI on institutional quality is not sensitive to model specifications, control variables, or 
estimation techniques. This supports our hypothesis that FDI inflows have a positive impact 
on the quality of property rights.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion  
This paper introduces a hypothesis about the impact of FDI inflows on property rights in host 
countries and provides an empirical assessment. The results show that FDI inflows have a 
positive and highly significant impact on property rights. These results seem very robust and 
are not affected by model specification, control variables, or estimation techniques. The main 
conclusion of this paper is that FDI inflows can explain differences in property rights across 
counties and over time. In particular, FDI inflows have a positive influence on property rights 
in the host country.  
This conclusion has several important implications for academic and practical purpose. First, 
it shows a new mechanism by which FDI inflows may positively affect economic 
performance in the host country. And given the importance of institutional quality in 
determining economic growth, this mechanism may be comparable to other positive effects 
of FDI. Our results suggest that foreign investors do not only import high quality 
manufacturing and production technology to the host county but also import high quality 
social technology and institutions. 
 
Our findings also are a significant step towards the understanding of the determinants of 
institutional quality and institutional change. It establishes the integration into the world 
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economy, and FDI inflows in particular, as a new factor in determining property rights.  
Some policy implications emerge from this conclusion. First, there appears to be a positive 
interaction between the integration into the world economy as developmental strategy and 
institutional reform, where efforts spent in attracting FDI may well enforce institutional 
reform efforts. Furthermore, a policy more open to FDI may lead to improved institutional 
quality. Further analysis is needed to underpin these policy recommendations however.   
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Appendix A: Sample and Sources of Data 
 
The analysis covers 70 developing countries over the period 1981-2005.  All the variables are 
computed as five-year averages, covering the period 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, 1996-2000, 
and 2001-05.  
 
Countries in the sample:  
 
Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, 
Colombia, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep., El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, 
Korea Rep., Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela RB, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
  
Variable Definition Source 
FDI  Net FDI inflows as Percentage of GDP 
United Nations, UNCTAD’s 
World Investment Directory.  
GDP Growth GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Property Rights 
 
Average of indices of Law and Order &  
Investment Profile, scale 0-12. 
Calculated from ICRG Data, 
PRS Group. 
Ethnic Tensions Tensions among ethnic groups, Scale 0-12. Calculated from ICRG Data, PRS Group. 
Natural 
Resources 
Abundance 
Ratio of primary exports to GDP World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Trade  Export + Imports as Percentage of GDP World Bank, World Development Indicators 
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- Changes in Property Rights Index in selected countries. 
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